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ABSTRACT 
The owner’s intention of WWER-440/213 units in Central Europe is to keep the plants in operation as long as 
technically feasible and reasonable from business point of view. The preconditions of the long term operation and 
license renewal are the safety and good plant condition. The past and recent ageing management practices have to 
ensure the required condition and performance of the essential structures, systems and components. In the paper an 
overall picture of the long term operation of WWER-440/213 units is given. The review covers ageing of 
mechanical equipment, building structures and electrical equipment to. Key elements of the ageing management 
are identified and described. Basic issues of assessment of ageing of essential structures, systems and components, 
also the issues related to availability of design basis information and lacking environmental qualification are 
discussed. Reference examples typical for WWER-440/213 plants long term operation are given from Paks 
Nuclear Power Plant practice.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The WWER-440/213 nuclear power plants in Central Europe were designed and constructed at the technical 
level of late seventies early eighties. Design, operation and maintenance practice of WWER units had been 
determined in great extent by the Soviet rules and regulations and less by the national regulations of the recipient 
countries. Beginning from mid eighties identification and elimination of safety deficiencies had been the strategic 
tasks of the operators of WWER-440/213 NPPs in Central Europe. The comprehensive safety upgrading 
programmes always resulted in essential achievements, e.g. the core damage frequency has been decreased more 
than order of magnitude, and the level of safety of these units is comparable today to the safety level of PWR’s of 
same vintage around the world.  
Assessment of safety, definition of safety upgrading measures and confirmation of effects of the implemented 
measures had been carried out either in the frame of periodic safety reviews (PSR) and/or in form of renewal of 
final safety analyses report (FSAR).  
The extensive safety upgrading projects caused a very important side effect: great part of the safety systems 
had been modified and modernised. Therefore systems or part of safety systems, structures and components are 
practically not aged. For example at Paks NPP in the frame of seismic upgrading programme steel and reinforced 
concrete members of the main building complex had been reconstructed and fixed, also the status of anchorages, 
supports of all safety classified components had been evaluated and reconstructed.  
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The PSR and renewal of the FSAR resulted at al plants in the recognition of the same issues relevant to the 
long term operation (LTO) of WWER-440/213 units: necessity of conscious ageing management and maintenance 
programmes, reconstitution of the design bases, also lacking of environmental qualification. 
The owner’s intention of WWER-440/213 units in Central Europe is to keep the plants in operation as long as 
technically feasible and reasonable from business point of view, e.g. to run Paks NPP 20 years behind the planned 
30 years of operational lifetime. The preconditions of the long term operation are the safety and good plant 
condition. The first is ensured by the implemented safety upgrading programmes, commitment of operators and 
proper regulation. The last depends mainly on the past and recent practice of in-service inspection, maintenance, 
testing and recording the lifetime relevant data as well as on the knowledge of the design basis of the lifetime 
limiting structures, systems and components.  
The national regulations with respect to LTO are different in countries operating WWER-440/213 units. In 
some countries, e.g. Czech Republic, where the plants have permanent operational license, PSR might be a tool for 
the control and approval of the operation for the next PSR period. In Hungary the operational license is limited in 
time, a formal license renewal required for the extended operational time. However, these differences influence 
mainly the procedures of the licensees to obtain regulatory approval for LTO and much less the technical content of 
the tasks to be performed for the LTO. 
In the paper an overview is of ageing management programmes is given, which shows the most important 
tasks and issues related to long term operation of WWER-440/213 type units. The main areas considered are the 
mechanical, electrical and I&C, also building structures of the plant.  
2. BASIC TASKS FOR ENSURING OF SAFE LONG TERM OPERATION 
2.1 Main tasks for long term operation 
The generic goal of the overall plant-life management (PLiM) is to ensure the cost effective and competitive 
production under stringent condition of safety. Generally, PLiM covers all systems, structures and components 
(SSC) of the plant, also the infrastructure necessary for the functioning of the operating organisation.  
Within the scope of the PLiM programme, ensuring the intended function of the safety classified SSC has the 
most important role. Independent form the regulatory framework related to the LTO, the required technical 
condition of the safety classified items and their intended function has to be ensured by proper ageing management, 
maintenance practice and reconstructions. For the acceptance of LTO it has to be demonstrated that the effects of 
aging will be adequately managed so that the intended safety functions will be maintained consistent with the 
current licensing basis for the period of extended operation.  
In case of licence renewal of Paks NPP, the programs and activities for managing the effects of ageing have to 
be reviewed and their adequacy have to be demonstrated. Also the time-limited aging analyses, e.g. fatigue, 
pressurized thermal shock (PTS) analysis, also limited in time qualifications have to be reviewed taking into 
account the operational history and forecast for the period of extended operation. If necessary modifications and 
additions to the in-service-inspection, maintenance, testing programmes, etc. have to be identified, developed and 
implemented for the management of aging during the period of extended operation.  
Independent from the national regulations the long-lived, passive, non replaceable, non renewable SSCs have 
specific and decisive role in the programmes for long term operation. Ageing of these SSC defines and limits the 
plant lifetime, therefore the ageing of long-lived, passive non replaceable SSC shall be managed in proper way to 
ensure the safe operation for long term. In the Hungarian regulation the ageing of long-lived, passive SSC are in 
the focus of licence renewal. The ageing management of active short-lived components is ensured by proper 
testing, monitoring, maintenance and replacement practice. In case of Paks NPP the USNRC Maintenance Rule 
approach has been adapted for monitoring effectiveness of the maintenance activities.  
Comparing the practice of different WWER-440/213 operators, the practically the same SSC are in the focus 
of programmes determining the feasibility of safe LTO.  
2.2 Adequacy of the AMP 
In the last ten years comprehensive ageing management studies have been performed for the most important 
safety related SSCs of the WWER-440/213 units in the countries operating this type of units. The reviews of AMP 
were performed in the frame of PSR in accordance to the guidelines developed on the basis of IAEA Safety Guide 
50-SG-O12. The focused ageing studies and ageing management programme (AMP) reviews were based also on 
the IAEA methodology (e.g. IAEA TRS 338).  
Most countries operating WWER-440/213 units developed their own guidelines for ageing management and 
long term operation. Some countries like Czech Republic, also Slovak Republic mainly follow the IAEA 
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documents while developing own guidelines and procedures. Russia defines its regulation mainly on the basis of 
own experience and know-how. 
Hungary adapted the Licence Renewal Rule and other relevant documents of the US NRC and also the basic 
recommendations and guidance of the IAEA. The requirements related to the AMP and other relevant activities of 
the licensee are given in the guidelines. These documents define the regulatory control and the quality assurance in 
the ageing management too. The SSCs requiring specific attention are identified and listed in the Appendix of 
Guideline "Regulatory control of the ageing management programmes". For these items the regulation prescribes 
the aim and content of AMP. The Hungarian regulation takes into account specific features of the WWER-440/213 
units, the results of the ageing studies, also the findings of AMP reviews in the PSR. The aging management 
programmes are part of plant existing operational, maintenance, and in service inspection practice. Ageing 
management programmes should have the following main attributes: 
1. Definition of SSC that are subject to ageing management. 
2. Actions capable to prevent or mitigate aging process. 
3. Surveillance, monitoring and testing all parameters related to degradation of the function of SSC.  
4. Investigation of aging factors that may cause degradation or loss of function of SSC. 
5. Trend-analysis to predict degradation process and to perform corrections in time. 
6. Acceptance criteria to provide maintaining intended function. 
7. Correction measures to prevent or solve problems. 
8. Feedback process to ensure that preventive actions are proper. 
9. Administrative control of the processes. 
10. Obtaining information from operation practice to ensure that ageing management is properly carried 
out. 
3. MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT 
3.1 Mechanical systems and components relevant for safe LTO 
The scope SSC relevant to the safety of LTO can be divided into two groups: There are selected SSC which 
requires individual ageing management programmes (sometimes several), like reactor pressure vessel (RPV), 
steam generator (SG), reactor cooling system (RCS), emergency core cooling system (ECCS), etc. (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1, Selected, important mechanical systems and components 
Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) Pressurizer 
Reactor vessel internals Hydroaccumulators and other SSC of ECCS 
Reactor vessel supports Pumps, valves and connecting piping of safety classes 2 and 3 
Control Rod Driving Mechanisms 
(SDRM) 
Emergency diesel-generator 
Reactor cooling system Containment isolation valves 
Piping connected to RCS Feed-water piping, pumps, valves 
Steam generator (SG) Safety related heat exchangers 
Main circulating pump (MCP)  Piping and component supports (also part of structures) 
Main gate valves (MGV) Containment ventilation system 
 
There are items, e.g. pipelines, pipe elements (elbows, T-pieces), valves, heat exchangers, which can be 
grouped into commodity groups according to type, material, working environment. The SSC within a group have 
the same degradation mechanism and about the same operational and maintenance history. The definition of the 
commodity groups is performed applying the attributes given in the Table 2 in all reasonable combinations. 
 
Table 2, Attributes for the definition of commodity groups 
Safety classification Type of SSC Medium Material 
Safety Class 1 
Safety Class 2 
Safety Class 3 
Non-safety class 4, which failure may 
inhibit intended safety function 
Valve body 
Pump body 
Pipe and pipe elements 
Heat exchanger 
Tank 
Borated water 
Prepared water 
river water 
Steam 
Gas-steam mixture 
Acid or alkali 
Oil  
other 
Stainless steel 
Cast stainless steel 
Carbon steel 
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3.2 Degradation mechanisms and AMP in case of mechanical systems and components 
The most important mechanical systems and components requiring specific AMP are listed in the table 3. 
The ageing mechanisms are also identified in the Table 3. The ageing mechanisms were identified on the basis of 
the results of the ageing studies and findings of AMP reviews in the PSR. The specific features of the 
WWER-440/213 units are taken into account. 
 
Table 3, List of important mechanical systems and components and the ageing mechanisms 
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RPV x x x x x x        
In-vessel structure x x x x x     x x x  
Reactor supports x  x      x     
CRDM x x  x     x x x   
Pressurizer x   x x x x       
Steam generator x x  x x  x x x x x x  
MGV and MCP x x  x x  x    x x  
RCS main circulating pipes x x   x  x      x 
Pipes connected to RCS x x   x  x      x 
Hydroaccumulators     x    x     
ECCS quick closing valves x   x   x  x  x x  
ECCS pumps x   x  x x     x  
Low-pressure ECCS pumps x      x  x   x  
Sprinkler pumps x      x  x   x  
High-pressure boron pumps x   x   x     x  
Pumps of make-up system x   x   x     x  
Tank of essential service water x        x     
Essential service water pumps x   x   x     x  
Air-trap valves         x   x  
Containment quick-closing valves x   x   x       
Normal + emergency feed-water x x     x  x    x 
pipes 
Normal + emergency feed-water x      x  x     
pumps 
Safety classified piping and x   x   x  x     
piping elements 
3.3 Issues of ageing management of mechanical systems and components 
3.3.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel 
-440/213 units were shipped with complex surveillance specimen sets. 
Imp
n the first four 
cam
s, 
low leakage core configurations are used according to the life time management program. This resulted in 30% 
decreasing of the fast neutron flux to the RPV wall and welded joint No 5/6. 
The reactor vessels at WWER
lementation of the surveillance programme was obligatory. The recording of the operational history and 
control of the ageing of RPV is generally properly established at these units. National and international research 
programmes were and are carried out for the investigation the ageing phenomena of these RPV.  
In case of WWER-440/213 RPV at Paks NPP the original surveillance sets were irradiated i
paigns. Because of the relatively high lead factors, by the end, they were through a “pre-ageing” process 
equivalent to the planned extended life cycle of the reactors. To ensure continuous monitoring of the vessel wall 
condition new supplementary surveillance chains were placed in the vessel after taking out the original ones.  
Although the vessel wall and the next to the core circumferential weld have good embrittlement propertie
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Considering the feasibility of LTO it was found, that the RPV at the units 3-4 reactor vessels do not require 
extra measures even at 50 years of lifetime. At unit 2 the water in the ECCS tanks has to be heated up in order to 
decrease stress levels caused by pressurized thermal shock (PTS) transients. At unit 1, in case of the 50-year 
lifeti
, which will take into account the applicable best 
prac R-440/213.  
3.3.
 to be the major life limiting degradation mechanisms for the 
location of water injection nozzle and the surge nozzle with the surge line. In the case of the injection nozzle, 
erature differences is implemented. Sample type 
fatig
m generators determines the plant economically competitive life. The life time limiting 
ageing mechanism of the SG is the Outer Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking (ODSCC) of the austenitic 
ar typically (80%) at the grid structure supporting the tube 
bun
d from carbon steel) 
e on and erosion 
resi t
e d the rate of ODSCC in the SG. Consequently, a better 
plug
en 15%. Considering the past experience and the recent plugging trend of the heat exchange tubes, 
non
 the remaining corrosion products. It is 
diff g process has to be well monitored in the future.  
3.4 
delivered partly by the supplier or developed by Hungarian institutes follow basically 
the ex-Soviet regulation. Recent review and overall updating of the ISI programmes should adopt the 
 Section XI, Inservice Inspection). Extensive 
stud
me, in addition to the ECC heating-up, the annealing of the welded joint No. 5/6 close to the core has to be 
considered with 50% probability in the business assessment. 
There are two issues requiring further development in case of Hungary:  
According to present knowledge, PTS is the lifetime limiting process of the RPV. Methodology of the PTS 
evaluation has to be established in the Hungarian regulation
tices, features of RPV and the thermo-hydraulic peculiarities of the WWE
Annealing of the critical weld of the RPV is a well developed technology. In case if annealing will be applied, 
the re-emrittlement process has to be understood. 
2 Pressurizer and surge line aging management 
In the case of the pressurizer, fatigue is supposed
partial cycle counting, based on partial water injection temp
ue monitoring has been used by processing surface temperature measurement results for AMP of the surge 
line. Other possible degradation mechanisms are managed mainly by in-service inspection (ISI) programs 
conducted every 4 years. 
3.3.3 Steam generator aging management  
The status of the stea
heat-exchange tubes. The ODSCC indications appe
dle, where the secondary circle corrosion products with concentrated corrosive agents are absorbed. A 100% 
Eddy-current inspection programme is implemented for monitoring of the tubes. Samples were cut out from the 
plugged tubes for the investigation of the phenomena.  
The ODSCC was essentially slowed down by series of modifications:  
• Replacement of the condensers, the new condensers have austenitic tubes 
• Removal of copper from the secondary circuit 
• Replacement of the feed-water distributor (the old was manufacture
• Cleaning the heat exchanging surface of the SG 
• Introducing a high pH secondary water regime. 
Th  high-pressure pre-heaters will be replaced. The new pre-heaters will have erosion-corrosi
stan  tubes. 
Th se measures completely change the conditions an
ging trend is experienced, which can be expected in long-term, too. The reserve in heat exchange surface of 
the SG is more th
e of the SG would exceed 10% by the end of 50 year of operation.  
Two issues have to be mentioned in relation of SG ageing:  
The ODSCC on the heat exchanging tube surface is slowed down by the measures implemented. The gaps 
between the tubes and support grid are still the critical places because
icult to forecast the ODSCC rate in the gaps, therefore the agein
Under new condition sludge may be accumulated at the bottom area of the SG. An effective draining of the 
sludge has to be solved.  
Changing of the periodicity of the ISI programmes 
The ISI programmes 
state-of-the-art techniques and methodologies (e.g. the ASME
ies are going on to provide a solid basis for changing the rules and techniques of ISI. One practical question 
is the periodicity of the ISI programmes, which is 4 years at Paks NPP, in accordance to the ex-Soviet regulation. 
Because of practical reason the new ISI period should be 8 years. In the same time the scope and depth of ISI 
programmes have to be upgraded, too.  
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4. BUILDING STRUCTURES 
4.1 Structures and structural components relevant for safe LTO 
ures and structural components are drawn into the scope of LTO are the 
structures and structural elements rated into the Safety Classes 2, and 3 (Safety Class 1 structures do not exist), 
performing of any safety function if 
dam
rbine, others), embedment  
 the soil), support (channels) and protection structures for 
 supporting structures) 
12. dded into concrete. 
fire proof coating, etc. 
 omponents: 
Concrete embedded part of the electrical and mechanical penetrations 
r doors (including fire protection doors) 
4.2 Degr  
the Appendix of Hungarian Regulatory Guideline "Regulatory inspection of the ageing management 
onsidered. Example of this is 
give
item place of the degradation degradation mechanism consequences Reg. contr. 
The civil engineering struct
and from non-safety structures and structural elements those that endanger 
aged (interactions). Also the structures and structural elements rated into the Seismic Classes 1 and 2 are 
included into the scope. The list covers the following structures: 
1. Containment (load bearing structure and the liner) 
2. Structures inside the containment pressure boundary (boxes, etc.) 
3. Other safety classified buildings (e.g. Diesel) 
4. Auxiliary building 
5. Spent fuel pool (as a part of main reactor building) 
6. Cooling water intake and outlet structures 
7. Foundation systems (tu
8. Stacks 
9. Buried pipelines (with direct interface with
the underground pipelines. 
10. Cranes (the
11. Pipe whip restraints  
Structural components embe
13. Decontaminable painting, coating, 
 
Item No 12 above covers also the following structural c
• Interfaces/anchoring of HVAC ducts (embedded in concrete or not) 
• 
• Equipment hatches and hermetic doors, small hatches and othe
adation mechanisms and AMP in case of building structures
The structures and structural components requiring focused ageing management programmes are listed in 
programmes". For these items the regulation gives the ageing mechanisms to be c
n in the Table 4. It is also shown in the Table 4, what ageing consequences are subject of regulatory control. 
 
Table 4, Ageing mechanisms of lifetime limiting structures and structural components 
Reinforced concrete corrosion 
change of the material 
cracks 
 
Containment: 
reinforced 
p  
racks 
racks 
g the reactor 
m vertical, 
DM 
no 
 
no 
no 
roperties due to heat or 
irradiation 
fatigue 
settlement 
cracks 
c
c
declinin
axis fro
limit for CR
 
no 
yes 
yes 
ete 
structures of th
hermetic pa
the main 
building 
leakage 
corrosion 
embrittlem
declining the reac
axis from
limit for 
yes 
yes 
 
In case of reinforced concrete structures the e.g. boric acid)  settleme e the 
relevant ageing phenomena. Ambient vibratio henomena  support s ures. 
Cor sion is the dominant ageing mechanism of the steel structures and structural components.  
The particular ageing monitoring programmes developed by the NPP Paks are listed in the Table 5. The 
programmes comply with the Hungarian guideline, which regulates the ISI of civil structures. The programmes 
include essential elements of ASME XI Subsections IWL and IWE. 
 chemical ( attack, leaching and
in case of some
nt ar
n is relevant p truct
support plates in the concrete corrosion leakage 
concr
e 
rt of 
liner corrosion yes 
RPV support Support grid, support plate fatigue 
ent 
tor 
 vertical, 
CRDM 
yes 
ro
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Table 5, Existing ageing monitoring programmes of structures and structural components 
Building or part of the structure aim of the measurements evaluation 
bui
and criteria 
lding monitoring 
turbine building: 
turbine foundation 
reinforced 
concrete structure 
vibration 
monitoring 
fixed measuring 
po
ExpertAlert system; 
ints;  evaluation of bending 
technological and fire 
water pumping house; 
all structural 
members;  
overall condition 
of building 
walk-down and 
visual control 
expert judgment 
12 bar fire water 
pumping house; 
 
checklist 
auxiliary building
joints according to 
cooling water outlet 
s 
king  and 
te 
reinforced 
concrete 
structural 
member
concrete crac
and overall 
condition 
walk down
visual control; 
NDE of concre
expert judgment 
main building 
complex: all 
buildings, including 
reactor and auxiliary 
buildings, stacks, 
diesel-building and 
 
reference points building 
movements; 
f 
ed by 
movements 
etical 
measuring points; 
3D evaluation of building 
movements; correlation with 
e; 
Allowable declination of 
vertical axis of reactor 
pressure vessel defined by 
other structures
settlement; control 
of stability o
cracks caus
fixed geod
ground-water tabl
functioning of CRDM 
reactor buildi
slabs and walls 
ng: floor heavy reinforced 
concrete 
th 
samples; 
inspection of 
check-holes 
nd 
 
interaction wi
boric acid media 
investigation of control of mechanical and 
chemical properties a
comparison with reference
values 
reactor building, 
turbine building; 
or 
slabs and walls 
reinforced 
concrete 
ssible 
leakages and 
investigation of 
samples; 
es 
 
intermediate building 
and galleries: flo
control of po
consequent 
leaching 
inspection of 
check-hol
control of mechanical and 
chemical properties and
comparison with reference 
values 
walls, members concrete of cracks 
measuring of
crack sizes 
control 
condition of concrete, 
comparison of parameter
with reference values 
reactor building floo
slabs and walls 
r carbon steel liner  
corrosion rate, 
akages 
of 
liner wall 
e 
aces 
 corrosion rate and 
thickness; focused 
rall 
an 
 with 
control of
identification of 
possible le
US measuring 
thickness at th
identified pl
control of
investigation if the ove
leak-tightness is less th
the reference value for the 
given unit (comparison
allowable leak rate) 
reactor building and 
auxiliary building: 
floor slabs and walls 
decontaminable 
coating and 
painting 
painting 
 and 
checklist 
control of 
condition of 
coating and 
walk down
visual control 
according to 
expert judgment 
parts protection doors; according to 
checklist, 
fluorescent te
expert judgment 
.3 Issues of a
Monitoring and IS
ools fo
anagement o
programmes, ma
geing of the structu
uilding str
tenance and recons
 
uction practice 
ponents. This
od of operation, t
reactor building: reinforced control of stability  of mechanical 
s 
main building 
complex: all building 
hatches, gates, 
penetrations fire 
 
control of 
condition of doors
walk down and 
visual control 
st 
4 geing m f b uctures
I in tr of the Paks NPP are the main 
t r managing the a res and structural com  system seems to be effective for 
ensuring the required condition of structures for the extended peri oo. 
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4.3.1 Non-uniform settlement 
Geodetic control of the settlement was started during the construction. The control of settlement is 
periodically performed 4 times per year. The measured results have to be evaluated and reported yearly. Basic 
findings are as follows: 
• Uneven settlement in NW-N direction is observed at unit No 4. The non-uniformity of settlement did 
lting of the RPV vertical axis, which would cause problems for CRDM. 
ain building of unit 4, settlement is consolidated at all buildings. 
Furt
4.3.2 Le
n m the time of start up 
tests o aling of doors and hatches. It means that the 
leak
Table 6 below, which is taken from the last updated Final Safety Analysis Report, shows the details about 
value of the leakage at WWER-440/213 containment is high; it 
equ
nagement and maintenance. 
not result in non-allowed ti
• The non-uniform settlement at the unit 4 and especially the relative settlement between the containment 
and attached gallery building cause cracks in the non-structural masonry walls in the gallery building. 
• Except of the m
• Stacks are consolidating after their recent reconstruction.  
her assessment of settlement is planned to clarify whether the settlement of the Unit 4 is  
ak-tightness of the containment 
Co tainment leakage has a complex origin. Investigations carried out practically fro
 sh ws that the containment leakage is mainly caused by the se
age itself is a maintenance problem rather than ageing issue. 
the contributors of the leakage. The allowable 
als to 14.7%/day at the post large-break loss-of-coolant accident, when the design internal containment 
pressure equals to 2.4 MPa. Although the containments at Paks NPP have much better characteristics, the leak 
tightness of the containment remains the basic issue of ageing ma
 
Table 6, Contributors to the containment leak rate 
component of the containment contribution to the leakage, [%] 
sealing of the doors 20,53 
sealing of the hatches at the service floors 77,33 
welding of the liner 0,28 
Isolating valves 0,82 
Electrical penetrations 1,04 
total 100,00
udies 
s and structural co e desi
al of the planned LTO.  the li
geing
 
4.3.3 Need of st
The structure mponents at Paks NPP wer gned in general for the lifetime 50 years, i.e. 
for the time interv The design limits of fetime shall be reviewed and the validity of 
the time-limiting a  analyses has to be demonstrated for the licence renewal.  
In the near future, more detailed examinations are planned e.g. in the following areas: 
 in connection with the subsidence monitoring of structures; 
4.3.4 Ex s 
omponents have been reinforced or reconstructed in the frame of Safety 
Upg i 2000 tons of seismic structural upgrades of steel construction, 
upg grades, etc.). Consequently, essential part of the building structures 
and structural components are renewed, practically not aged.  
 concrete ventilation stacks has been observed 
due
ess improving has been performed on the basis of 
local leakage examinations. Concrete grouting was implemented and cladding jointing nods were repaired. These 
measures have been resulted a significant enhancement in compactness of the containment. 
• Detailed analyses
• Corrosion of concrete reinforcement steel and inserted steel elements in concrete; 
• Examination containment steel structures and reinforced concrete structures supporting some specific 
equipment that are exposed to higher temperature  
• Examination of penetrations; 
• Examination of machine foundations; 
• Review of carbon steel structures. 
amples of the already implemented measure
Essential structures and structural c
rad ng Program of Paks NPP (more than 
rades of the supports, fire protection up
A progressive degradation (cracking, etc.) of the reinforced
 to pure construction quality. An overall reconstruction has been implemented using injection technique and 
adding reinforced concrete inner and outer shells. 
Repair of some specific parts of carbon steel liner and claddings and decontaminable coatings had been 
accomplished or is in progress. Improvement of the leak-tightn
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Concrete ageing in boric environment was observed in the region of pools. Periodic control of the reinforced 
concrete behaviour subjected to the effects of boric acid environment was implemented: specimens taken, 
laboratory testing, slight increase of porosity of the concrete and the pH-value. Essential improvement was 
reac
onstruction. 
5.1 
t”. The 
regu gradation mechanisms are also 
wal includes a relatively small part of the electrical and I&C items. These are 
 those safety classified, which have limited in time qualification. Full scope of 
ct of the PLiM programme. 
Tab
hed by reconstruction of liner in the pools. 
Severe biological corrosion observed in service water systems piping. The monitoring, inspection, 
destructive examination, etc. was implemented. An overall reconstruction of the system is going on. The 
experience gained with respect of ageing has been taken into account while designing the rec
In case of decontaminable coating 15% of the surface should be repaired.  
5. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
Electrical and I&C relevant for safe LTO 
Table 7 shows examples for electrical components required ageing management programmes. Examples are 
take ntrol of ageing managemenn from the Appendix to the Hungarian Regulatory Guide “Regulatory co
lation defines the minimum scope of ageing management. The dominating de
indicated. The scope of licence rene
the passive components (cables) and
electrical and I&C systems and components is subje
 
le 7, Examples of the high priority electrical and I&C items and their ageing mechanisms 
Item Place of the 
degradation  
Mechanism of the degradation Worst consequences 
XLPE I&C cables in harsh 
environment 
Cover and core 
isolation 
Thermal aging; 
Change of the material propertie
Crack / Loss of function 
s 
due to heat or irradiation 
under loss-of-coolant 
condition 
6 kV PVC power cables in Metal structure of Humidity penetration Corrosion Decrease isolation 
channel /hu  
environmen
cab of resi n/ midity
t/ 
les  metal structure  stance /loss of functio
environment structure Corrosion of join connectors 
 case of electrical and aks NPP 
Full scope ageing studi
electrical, and I & C
es had been prepared between years 1995-2001 for th  Paks NPP for the following
1. Equipment of ele
• Bus ca
• 
tric power generatio
inets 
ad-line towers, m
n and transmission syst
um and high voltage
Cable connection in harsh Corrosion of metal Humidity/chemical  
ts 
Increase transit resistance of 
5.2 Degradation mechanisms and AMP in I&C at P
e  
 items: 
c ems: 
b
Overhe edi  insulators 
• LV and HV cables of power supply systems 
d electrical equipment 
2. Eq l systems: 
t electrical penetration for E, I&C 
Under o rating s the following factors were identified as important for the 
degradation: 
• Tem ic materials, commonly used as insulation and/or sealing parts of 
com nent actor of aging effect.  
• Cables for containment electrical penetration 
• Cable joints and assemblies 
• Enclose
• Battery packs 
uipment of the technologica
• Fixtures for Transmitters 
• Impulse pipes and assemblies 
• Operation monitors 
• Relay boards 
• Cables for E, I&C equipment 
• Cables of containmen
• Cable joints and assemblies 
• Terminal boxes 
pe  and loss-of-coolant condition
perature: In case of organ
po s high temperature is the main f
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• Radi ion: y the γ-rays shall be taken into account. At Paks NPP, the more 
sens he less sensitive is the XLPE. Therefore, PVC insulated cables are 
opper parts that are located next to the reactor, where these parts may be activated. 
ting the sealing materials of various 
• 
• he applied chemicals (boric acid, hydrazine, etc.) may penetrate into sealing of electrical 
• 
or seismic effect on equipment, the response function of 
ling elements between the fixture and the 
 
5.3 Age
5.3.1 Te
Mon
at Inside the containment, mainl
itive material is the PVC and t
not used for safety-related function inside the containment. Neutron radiation shall be considered only 
for c
• Pressure changes: Extreme pressure changes may occur in loss-of-coolant (LOCA) conditions and may 
endanger the proper operation of systems and components affec
equipments. 
Humidity: Humidity of the containment may change from several reasons, e.g. leakage or break of pipes, 
unintended operation of fire extinguisher appliances, LOCA. Penetrating humidity may result in 
malfunction of electrical and I&C equipment. 
• Steam: In LOCA conditions, steam may condense on the surface of equipment causing quick 
temperature-rise and it may penetrate into the equipment. 
Chemicals: T
equipment, reducing dielectric strength, and causing corrosion. 
Seismic events: Seismic effects and vibration may degrade the functionality of certain E, I&C 
equipment (relays, transmitters, motors, etc.). F
that particular equipment is the most important factor, which depends on the frequency and amplitude 
of the excitation, as well as the damping of the coup
equipment. In case of Paks NPP, the SSE (SL-2) is 0.25g horizontal acceleration measured on flat 
ground surface. For the OBE (SL-1) is 50% of SSE was applied.
ing monitoring and mitigation measures applied for electrical and I&C 
sting and Monitoring Practices for passive Components 
itoring parameters of cables in operational environment: The actual operational environment of cables 
ined by monitoring the temperature and the radiation of the his determ arsh environment of the containment 
during one operation cycle. A multi-channel data logger measures temperature, while radiation is measured by an 
ng may be used also 
for the qualification tests of active electrical and I&C components. 
aluminium-oxide ceramic thermo-luminescent detector. Result obtained during this monitori
Diagnostic tests on the insulation of 6 kV cables: If cables operate in humid environment (e.g. in ground or 
in cable channels), corrosion may occur in its steel and aluminium parts. Moisture causes treeing of the 
insulation material, and it leads to breakdown and loss of operability of the cable. The aim of the diagnostic 
methods is monitoring of the condition of the cable and prevention of malfunctions. The applied diagnostic 
methods are as follows: 
• Insulation resistance measurement 
• Dielectric test 
• Partial discharge (PD) measurement 
• Location of fault by oscillating wave test (OWTS) 
Accelerated aging tests on 0.6/1 kV I&C cables: During the test, the cables, which aged under known, 
normal operating conditions, are exposed to an accelerated thermal and radiation aging test in the depot, located 
in the co s determined by the acceleration factor of the depot. Before placing 
the cable t, an initial breaking test is performed to determine the elongation to break value (E/E0). 
After the n the depot, the cable samples are subjected to a simplified steam 
test t include the radiation test of LOCA condition. After 
the 
ntainment. The simulated lifetime i
s into the depo
 simulation of the required lifetime i
tha simulates line break conditions. This test does not 
simplified steam test, further breaking tests are performed on the cable insulating material. International 
experience shows that the cables keep their operability under LOCA condition if the elongation to break value 
measured after the aging remains higher than 50 % of the initial value. If it is lower than 50 % of the initial value, 
aging condition of the cable shall be determined by a full LOCA test (which includes LOCA radiation). This 
method can be applied in case of newly installed cables where the initial elongation to break value is known. If 
this value is unknown, the method cannot be applied. 
Operability test of safety related 0.6/1 kV I&C cables: In cases when the initial elongation to break value is 
not available, an accelerated aging and LOCA test is performed in laboratory to determine the condition of the 
cables. The safety related cables are exposed to an accelerated thermal and radiation aging according to the 
operational parameters of the environment where the cables are installed. This aging is followed by a LOCA test 
according to the LOCA parameters of the installation environment. The acceptance criterion is the operability of 
the cables. 
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5.3.
e sets of tests are conducted prior to unit shutdown to justify that the conditions of SSC required for 
RCS cool-down and depressurisation comply with the corresponding requirements. By means of successful 
ests, it can be proved that the SSCs fully match the requirements of power 
ope
5.3.
2 Component function tests 
The functional tests are carried out periodically to justify that the active systems and components are 
capable to maintain the functions they are designed for. Beside the justification of the functional availability, 
these tests are used to reveal potential deviations, before these deviations could lead to an inappropriate 
operation of the SSCs.  
Separat
execution of the on power functional t
ration mode. 
The on-power tests are executed according to a yearly schedule taking the corresponding prescriptions of the 
Technical Specification into account. 
3 Applied diagnostics and testing 
Test of 6 kV cables: For the safe operation, the most important property of cable insulation is the dielectric 
strength. Because it cannot be measured on cables in service, non-destructive tests are carried out to gain 
information on the present condition of the cable insulation. The non-destructive tests are based on the fact that 
ope
ery four years after shutdown of the unit. In case of fault or short-circuit to 
earth of the ungrounded system, the tests are carried out immediately when it is possible in service conditions. 
ted in the Table 8. 
rating conditions modify the dielectric parameters, like the insulation resistance, which can be measured. The 
non-destructive tests are performed ev
The regular diagnostics of 6 kV cables are lis
 
Table 8, Regular diagnostics of the 6 kV cables 
Measurement Reason Acceptance criteria 
Insulation 
resistance 
measurement:  
Resistance measurement provides information on the ageing 
and performance of the cable. Cables are disconnected and 
the cable ends are cleaned before the measurement.  
Acceptance criteria are 
described in the maintenance 
rules of the given cable type.
High voltage This test is intended to decide that the cable 
tes
can be switched 
onto the power source without the risk of breakdown. 
oltage is applied for a 
rval specified in the maintenance rules of the given 
The cable passed the test if 
neither breakdown nor 
flashover occurs and the 
remains 
t 
Cables are disconnected and a test v
time inte
cable type.  
leakage current 
constant or decreases during 
the test. 
HV test of the 
outer cover of 
the cable 
water 
nly for the present condition of the cable.  
 Discontinuities of the cable cover results in 
penetration that may increase treeing. As its consequence, 
partial discharges occur that may lead to breakdown. During 
the test the cables are disconnected and an AC test voltage is 
applied between cable shielding and ground. This test gives 
information o
Test voltage and test time are
described in the maintenance 
rules of the given cable type.
discharge test 
with OWTS 
of insulation faults on longer cables and determination the 
type a fault. It makes possible also the measurement of 
further parameters, such as the dielectric loss and cable 
capacitance. (Introduced recently at Paks NPP).  
 
ment Electrical Penetrations: Performed annually or in every four years at shutdown of the 
u ending on e test of tightness. Test 
p NPP. 
 regim
nit, dep
arameters and acce
Chemical
 type. Test includes insulation resistance measurement an
ptance criteria are given in the Maintenance Procedures of Paks 
es monitoring:
d th
 Rechargeable batteries of the safety uninterrup
visual inspection (general condition, leakage of acid, etc.). In ev
 the density of electrolyte are measured. Full main
Partial Oscillating wave test makes possible the accurate location 
 
Test of Contain
ted power supply systems are 
checked weekly by ery three months, temperature, 
the cell voltages and tenance is performed annually. 
estructive tests and material research carried out during NPP operation:D  At Paks NPP, destructive test applied 
for 
thod cannot be applied 
for 
monitoring cable insulation performance is the elongation to break method. As the cable ages, its insulation 
material becomes more rigid, therefore the elongation to break value decreases. The samples are tested in a tensile 
stress machine. The elongation is measured from initial state to break. At Paks NPP, this me
the originally installed cables.  
Besides the mentioned above diagnostics, also the main generators and high-voltage transformers are 
monitored on-power and during maintenance. 
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5.3.
This problem has to be solved in the near future by an enhanced ventilation 
syst
 finding and elimination hot spots. This is achieved mainly by 
maintenance of thermal isolation of pipes. 
ater may penetrate into sealing of electrical 
equi
6. K
6.1 
icensing basis requirement. In the same time 
kno
limited in time.  
 the DB reconstitution. The design 
base reconstitution covers the identification of DB functions, DB values and bounding conditions according to 
sing basis has been changed since the design and issuance of the operational licence, therefore 
n earthquake, which has 0.25g horizontal acceleration.) 
lts have been documented in the FSAR.  
design b
and con from the existing documentation, because essential part of 
supp i
output re
obviousl
For ions are not sufficient even if they 
wou
ormed for the FSAR (chapter 15) 
ss calculations, PTS, fatigue, etc.) have to be performed by state of the art 
met
6.2 u  issue 
h the originally installed E, I&C equipment did not have initial 
qua ca 3 plants. The issue was recognised already in the first 
PSR. Th ch equipment was started after the first PSR and is still in progress. The safety 
4 Issues of ageing management of electrical and I&C 
In the harsh environment of the containment, the relatively high temperature basically determines the aging 
of the organic materials. At certain places of the containment of the Paks NPP, the temperature exceeds the 
specified values, even in normal operating conditions. This high temperature accelerates the aging of insulating 
materials, especially that of cables. 
em.  
Further method to mitigation of aging is
In high-humidity places another source of problems is that w
pment. If chemicals are present, the penetrated humidity causes corrosion of terminal blocks, contacts of 
switches, etc. It may result in malfunction of E, I&C equipment. 
Lack of environmental qualification was recognised during the first PSR at all WWER-440/213 plants. It is a 
typical electrical and I&C issue. Because of the generic feature of the issue, it will be discussed in the chapter 6.  
EY ISSUES OF LONG TERM OPERATION OF WWER-440/213 
Design base reconstitution 
Lack of design base (DB) information is a generic issue of the WWER-440/213 type units.  
The availability of design base information is a current l
wledge of DB is absolutely unavoidable for the preparation of long-term operation and licence renewal, 
especially for the review of time-limited ageing analyses and for the review of the environmental qualification 
Operators of WWER-440/213 units have to perform specific project for
the licensing basis.  
For the DB reconstitution two basic problems have to be solved: 
• Collect and review the original design information. Main problem is that neither the codes and 
standards nor the safety analyses are properly described in the documents supplied with 
WWER-440/213 reactors and equipment. 
• The licen
the design base have to be newly created taking into account all essential changes in the licensing basis. 
(For example in case of Paks NPP seismic loads were not considered in the design. Recent DB includes 
safe shutdow
The DB reconstitution for Paks NPP has been performed. The resu
The collection and review of supplied documentation provided some understanding of the design. The 
ase functions could be identified. Further work needed for the proper definition of design base values 
ditions. They could not be reconstructed 
ort ng design documentation is missing, which includes the design inputs, design analyses, and design 
sults. Very often the final results of the design analyses are known only. In some cases the analyses are 
y obsolete.  
the completion of the design base information the original documentat
ld be available.  
Taking into account the second problem mentioned above, design input loads and conditions have to be 
newly defined for the most important SSC. Information sources for this work are: 
• the existing design information 
• results of the reviews 
• current licensing basis compliance check 
• analyses perf
• operation history.  
The necessary analyses (stre
hods for the scope of licence renewal. It means that for the most important SSC complete re-design has to be 
performed which will be the basis of the time-limited ageing analyses too.  
Eq ipment qualification
W en the Paks NPP was built, certain part of 
lifi tion. It is also a generic issue of WWER-440/21
e qualification of su
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rela
on can be performed by testing, data 
evaluation, evaluation and assessment of experience gained in operation and by combination of the mentioned 
s preferred especially for the qualification for harsh environmental 
con
meters, characteristic to the place of installation 
 approval of LTO the 
env m uipment has to be 
dem st
It is inal components conservatism cannot be reduced during 
rene l al required conservatism. 
7. CON
o  NPP is given in the 
pape
equired status and intended function for long-term. Ageing management programmes of essential 
mec
re the 
safety of long-term operation these types of units.  
ted equipment purchased later because of safety or other reason, was installed with proper qualification as 
required by the Hungarian regulations.  
The qualification of equipment delivered without proper first qualificati
methods. Whenever possible, testing i
ditions. Methods are given in industrial standards. Acceptance criteria shall follow the changes in the 
operating or environmental conditions. These changes may arise due to modifications of the NPP, or measures to 
improve safety. In the case of old equipment the conservatism of qualification might be minimised. The 
qualification of components without initial qualification consists of the following steps: 
• Definition of environmental para
• In case of safety equipment, definition of environmental parameters characteristic to the place of 
installation under loss-of-coolant condition 
• Definition of accelerated thermal and radiation aging test parameters 
• Performing laboratory test with above parameters (accelerated thermal and radiation aging, radiation 
exposure with LOCA condition, and simulation of LOCA) 
• Performance checks on tested sample to verify conformity with acceptance criteria. 
The regulation requires also the preservation of their qualified state. For the
iron ental qualification limited in time has to be reviewed and the operability of the eq
on rated.  
 important to mention that in case of orig
wa of qualifications, because the re-qualifications are made with the minim
CLUSIONS  
A c mplex picture of the ageing and ageing management of WWER-440/213 units of Paks
r. Significant for safe long-term operation structures, systems and components are identified. Proper level of 
understanding of the ageing phenomena is reached and adequate ageing management programmes were developed 
for ensuring the r
hanical, electrical and I&C systems and components and building structures cover all important aspects of 
ageing. It is shown that the recent practice and solution of identified ageing management issues will ensu
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